Defending Yesterday
Big oil, foreign lobbying, and the backlash against Europe’s Green Deal
Just before Christmas, my friend Anders Wijkman and I published an op ed in Aktuell Hållbarhet raising the alarm about how foreign corporate interests are lobbying to undermine European efforts to address the climate and ecosystem crisis. We described concrete and coordinated attempts to weaken EU legislation at a decisive moment.
These efforts need to be understood in a wider context. They align closely with the Trump administration’s newly published national security strategy, which explicitly prioritizes US economic and business interests over international cooperation, scientific consensus, and multilateral climate action. In this worldview, regulation is consistently treated as an obstacle, sustainability as a liability, and European ambition as something to be contained or neutralized.
What is at stake goes far beyond a single directive or policy package. It concerns the integrity of democratic decision making in the European Union itself. When powerful companies, particularly those based outside the EU, are able to operate under the radar to dilute legislation, exploit internal divisions, and trade environmental and human rights standards for short term competitiveness, democratic transparency is eroded. Climate policy becomes a bargaining chip. Accountability is deferred. And the space for meaningful, science based action continues to narrow.
What follows is a straight English translation of the op ed.
Just over a week ago, the Trump administration’s national security strategy was made public. Although much of the content is vague and partly contradictory, one thing stands out with great emphasis: to ensure, in every respect, that the United States is the biggest and the best.
Many of the document’s formulations are startling. Europe, the document warns, faces “the grim prospect of being wiped out as a civilization.” At the same time, we are told, there is hope, thanks to “the growing influence of strongly nationalist European parties.” The intention is that the United States should, in various ways, support parties such as the neo-Nazi AfD.
One formulation that truly stands out is the following: “We reject the catastrophic ideologies of ‘climate change’ and ‘net zero’ that have so severely damaged Europe, threaten the United States, and subsidize our adversaries.”
This statement denies the existence of climate change, defies the unified international scientific consensus, and claims that measures to reduce climate-related emissions have both harmed Europe and would additionally threaten the United States.
The real threat is, of course, not the EU’s climate policy, but that the United States, in addition to placing itself outside the global community’s efforts to stabilize the climate, is actively attempting to undermine European climate and energy policy. This threat must be taken seriously, not least because of documented attempts by American interests to influence legislative work in Europe. According to a recent report from the think tank SOMO (Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations), more than a dozen leading American companies have devoted significant resources and effort over the past six months to influencing ongoing negotiations at EU level concerning the Green Deal.
Companies such as Exxon Mobil, Chevron, Koch Industries, Honeywell, Nyrstar, Baker Hughes, Dow, Enterprise Mobility, and JP Morgan Chase have formed a special working group, the “Competitiveness Roundtable,” tasked with actively seeking to influence EU policy on climate, energy, the environment, and human rights.
The focus has primarily been on weakening the so-called CSDDD directive. This directive, which was finalized on December 8, aims to create a European framework for responsible and sustainable global value chains by requiring companies to take responsibility for both their environmental and social impacts, as well as those of their suppliers. The directive is intended to apply to large companies within the EU as well as to large non-EU companies.
The law was originally adopted in 2024, but demands have since been made for it to be softened. The European Commission therefore presented a modified version, Omnibus I, at the beginning of 2025, which has since been subject to negotiations in the Council and the European Parliament. It is these negotiations that the American companies, most of them linked to the fossil fuel industry, have attempted to influence in various ways.
What is striking is that the companies have acted entirely under the radar. A particular consultancy firm, Teneo, has served as a “cover,” ensuring that the companies never had to publicly disclose either their names or their nationality.
The American companies have primarily focused on softening, or removing, rules concerning climate reporting, corporate responsibility for human rights, and responsibility for how their subcontractors comply with corresponding requirements. Furthermore, they have worked hard to ensure that companies outside the EU are not affected by the law at all.
The Americans have also drawn the directive into trade negotiations between the EU and the United States. European car manufacturers have fought hard to avoid high tariffs in the United States when selling their vehicles. Here, a quid pro quo has been offered, whereby the rules in Omnibus I would be softened.
The method of operation has involved exploiting disagreements on various issues between EU member states and creating divisions between the Christian Democratic group (EPP) and the liberal and socialist groups in the European Parliament.
The Green Deal has so far enjoyed broad support from the EPP, the liberals, the socialists, and the Greens. However, during the negotiations on Omnibus I, the Parliament’s rapporteur, the Moderate Party’s Jörgen Warborn, has felt increasingly compelled to cooperate with the far right. It is also through this cooperation that a new majority has been created, something the American companies have consistently sought. Specifically targeting Warborn with lobbying efforts is highlighted as part of Teneo’s strategy.
What is now happening around the Green Deal is likely only a foretaste of what awaits in the area of digitalization, where major American tech companies are already exerting extensive influence to dilute or completely block European regulations on data protection, AI, and the so-called platform economy.
The EU is on its way to becoming the world’s most important standard-setter for the digital future. Precisely for this reason, pressure is intense from actors who want to retain their power positions and avoid accountability rules. The experience from the CSDDD shows how vulnerable this process is and how quickly European principles can erode if democracy is not protected here as well.
The actions of the American companies around Omnibus I are not illegal, but they are extremely challenging. They seek to undermine EU policy to their own advantage in areas where major values are at stake. Ultimately, this concerns the defense of our life-supporting system, not least the Earth’s climate balance, and thus the well-being of ourselves and future generations. That they have Donald Trump behind them is beyond any doubt, not least evident after the publication of the national security strategy.
What voters must react to is how easily certain political groups fall for arguments about “competitiveness” and “the need to simplify legislation.” The truth is that the threats to both the climate and vital ecosystems are so serious that compromises are not possible. The future is green, otherwise we have no future at all.
This raises a few unavoidable questions.
First, reciprocity. Would similar lobbying activities by European companies be legal, tolerated, or politically acceptable inside the United States? If not, what does that tell us about the symmetry of the relationship?
Second, transparency. How much money is actually being spent to influence European legislation in this way? Who is paying, through which intermediaries, and with what level of disclosure? A democratic system that cannot see who is shaping its laws is already weakened.
Third, scope. Which other policy areas are likely to face the same treatment next? Digital regulation, artificial intelligence, agriculture, data governance, platform economies. The pattern established here will not remain confined to climate and environmental policy.
Fourth, transatlantic alignment. When interests diverge this sharply, what remains of the idea of a shared project? This episode is another reminder that the transatlantic bond is no longer a given, but conditional, fragile, and increasingly transactional.
So sovereignty, once hollowed out, is hard to reclaim. When cronyism is rampant, when institutions are undermined, when money rules politics, what happens with European autonomy?